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Abstract
The model of wiretap channel (WTC) is important as it constitutes the essence of physical layer
security (PLS). Wiretap channel with noiseless feedback (WTC-NF) is especially interesting as it shows
what can be done when a private feedback is available. The already existing secret key based feedback
coding scheme focuses on generating key from the feedback and using this key to protect part of the
transmitted message. It has been shown that this secret key based feedback coding scheme is only
optimal for the degraded WTC-NF, and finding an optimal feedback scheme for the general WTC-NF
motivates us to exploit other uses of the feedback. In this paper, a new feedback coding scheme for
the general WTC-NF is proposed, where the feedback is not only used to generate key, but also used
to generate help information which helps the legitimate parties to improve the communication between
them. We show that the proposed new feedback scheme performs better than the already existing one,
and a binary example is given to further explain the results of this paper.
Index Terms
Feedback, secrecy capacity, wiretap channel, Wyner-Ziv coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Introducing both reliability and security constraints into a physically degraded broadcast
channel, the transmission over noisy communication channels was first studied by Wyner [1].
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2The model investigated in [1] is known as the physically degraded WTC, and its secrecy capacity
equals
Cds = max
P (x)
[I(Y1;X)− I(Y2;X)], (1.1)
where X , Y1 and Y2 are the random variables (RVs) representing the channel input, the legal
receiver’s received signal, and the wiretapper’s received signal, respectively. Moreover, in [1],
“physically degraded” indicates the existence of a Markov condition X → Y1 → Y2.
Wyner’s physically degraded model [1] was further studied by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2], where
the WTC without the degradedness assumption X → Y1 → Y2 was investigated. In [2], the
authors indicated that the secrecy capacity of this general WTC equaled
Cs = max
P (x|u),P (u)
[I(Y1;U)− I(Y2;U)]+, (1.2)
where the function [x]+ = max{x, 0}, U is the message random variable (RV), and U → X →
(Y1, Y2). Similar to the classical channel coding theorem proposed by Shannon, the channels
studied in [1] and [2] are assumed to be discrete memoryless. For the WTC with Gaussian
channel noise, the secrecy capacities of degraded and general cases are determined in [3] and
[4], respectively.
Later, the WTC has been re-considered by assuming the legal receiver’s received signal Y1
is accessible to the transmitter, and this model is known as the wiretap channel with noiseless
feedback (WTC-NF). In [5], Ahlswede and Cai pointed out that to enhance the secrecy capacity
of the WTC, the best use of the legal receiver’s feedback channel output is to generate random
bits from it and use these bits as a key by the transmitter protecting part of the transmitted
message. Using this feedback coding scheme, Ahlswede and Cai [5] provided a lower bound Rs
on the secrecy capacity Cfs of the general WTC-NF, and it is given by
Rs = max
P (x|u),P (u)
min{[I(Y1;U)− I(Y2;U)]+ +H(Y1|Y2, U), I(Y1;U)}, (1.3)
where U is the message RV defined the same as that in (1.2). Comparing (1.3) with (1.2), it
is obvious that the feedback coding scheme in [5] enlarges the secrecy capacity of the WTC.
Here note that the secrecy capacity Cfs of the general WTC-NF is still unknown. However, for
the physically degraded case (X → Y1 → Y2), Ahlswede and Cai [5] determined the secrecy
capacity, and it equals
Cdfs = max
P (x)
min{I(Y1;X)− I(Y2;X) +H(Y1|Y2, X), I(Y1;X)}. (1.4)
3The comparison of (1.4) and (1.1) also indicates that the feedback strategy in [5] enlarges the
secrecy capacity of the physically degraded WTC.
Based on the work of [5], Ardestanizadeh et al. [6] investigated the wiretap channel with rate
limited feedback, where the legal receiver is free to use the noiseless feedback channel to send
anything as he wishes (up to a rate Rf ). For the degraded case (X → Y → Z), they showed
that the best choice of the legal receiver is sending a key through the feedback channel, and
if the legal receiver’s channel output Y1 is sent, the best use of it is to extract a key. Later,
Cohen er al. [7] generalized Ardestanizadeh et al.’s work [6] by considering the WTC with
noiseless feedback, and with causal channel state information (CSI) at both the transmitter and
the legitimate receiver. Cohen er al. [7] showed that the transmitted message can be protected by
two keys, where one is generated from the noiseless feedback, and the other is generated by the
causal CSI. They further showed that these two keys help to enhance the achievable secrecy rate
of the WTC with rate limited feedback investigated in [6]. Besides the work of [7], other related
works in the WTC-NF with CSI are investigated in [8]-[9]. Here note that for the WTC-NF,
the current literature ([5]-[9]) shows that the secrecy capacity is achieved only for the degraded
case (Y2 is a degraded version of Y1), i.e., Ahlswede and Cai’s secret key based feedback coding
scheme [5] is only optimal for the degraded WTC-NF. Finding the optimal feedback coding
scheme for the general WTC-NF needs us to exploit other uses of the feedback.
In this paper, we show that for the WTC-NF, the feedback can not only be used to generate
key protecting the transmitted message, but also be used to generate help information which
helps the legitimate parties to improve the communication between them. Using this feedback
coding scheme, we obtain a new lower bound R∗s on C
f
s , and it is given by
R∗s = max
P (v|y1,u),P (x|u),P (u)
min{[I(Y1, V ;U)− I(Y2;U)]+ +H(Y1|Y2, U), I(Y1;U)}, (1.5)
where U is the message RV defined the same as those in (1.2) and (1.3), and the auxiliary RV V
denotes an estimation of U and Y1. Comparing (1.5) with (1.3), we can conclude that Ahlswede
and Cai’s lower bound Rs is no larger than our new lower bound R∗s since
I(Y1;U) ≤ I(Y1, V ;U). (1.6)
Moreover, it is easy to see that our new lower bound R∗s generalizes Ahlswede and Cai’s lower
bound Rs by considering an additional random variable V . Letting V be a constant, R∗s reduces
to Rs.
4Here note that the new feedback scheme achieving R∗s combines the Wyner-Ziv coding scheme
[10] used in the source coding with side information (SC-SI) problem with the Ahlswede and
Cai’s coding scheme [5] for the WTC-NF, and the motivation of this combined new scheme
is explained below. First, we notice that the achievability proof of the Ahlswede and Cai’s
achievable secrecy rate Rs [5] for the WTC-NF indicates that Rs relies heavily on the number
of the transmission codewords. Next, we apply the Wyner-Ziv coding scheme to the model of the
discrete memoryless channel (DMC) with feedback, and propose a new feedback coding scheme
for the DMC with feedback (formally introduced in Section II), which combines the Wyner-Ziv
coding scheme [10] used in the SC-SI problem with the block Markov coding scheme for the
feedback systems. We show that this new feedback coding scheme also achieves the capacity of
the DMC with feedback, and find that though this new scheme can not increase the capacity of
the DMC, the total number of the transmission codewords increases. Then it is natural to ask
whether the Wyner-Ziv coding scheme helps to increase the total number of the transmission
codewords in the Ahlswede and Cai’s coding scheme [5] for the WTC-NF, and whether the
Wyner-Ziv coding scheme helps to enhance the already existing achievable secrecy rate Rs for
the WTC-NF. To answer these two questions motivates us to propose the new feedback scheme
of this paper.
Now the rest of this paper is arranged as below. The necessary mathematical background, the
Wyner-Ziv coding scheme and its application to the DMC with feedback are provided in Section
II. The model formulation and the main result (a new achievable secrecy rate for the WTC-NF)
are given in Section III. The proof of the main result is given in Section IV. A special case of the
WTC-NF, which is called the non-degraded WTC-NF, is investigated in Section V. Numerical
results on the binary non-degraded WTC-NF are shown in Section VI, and a summary of this
work is given in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notations and Basic Lemmas
Notations: In the remainder of this paper, we use uppercase letters throughout to represent
random variables (RVs), lowercase letters for scalars or observed values of RVs, and calligraphic
letters for alphabets. A similar convention is applied to the random vectors and their sample
values. For example, Y1 denotes a RV, and y1 is a specific value in Y1. Similarly, Y N1 denotes
a random N -vector (Y1,1, ..., Y1,N), and yN1 = (y1,1, ..., y1,N) is a specific vector value in YN1
5Fig. 1: The general WTC-NF
that is the N -th Cartesian power of Y1. Moreover, we use P (x) as an abbreviation of the event
probability Pr{X = x}, and notice that the log function takes base 2.
An independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) produced vector xN with respect to (w.r.t.) the
probability P (x) is -typical if for all x ∈ X ,
|pixN (x)
N
− P (x)| ≤ ,
where pixN (x) denotes the number of x showing up in xN . The strong typical set TN (P (x))
consists of all typical vectors xN . The following lemmas with respect to TN (P (x)) will be used
in the remainder of this paper.
Lemma 1: (Covering Lemma [15]): Let UN and V N(i) (i ∈ I and |I| ≥ 2NR) be i.i.d.
produced random sequences respectively related to the probabilities P (u) and P (v). The random
vector UN is independent of V N(i). Then there exists η > 0 such that
lim
N→∞
P (∀i ∈ I, (UN , V N(i)) /∈ TNη (P (u, v))) = 0
if R > I(U ;V ) + ϕ(η), where ϕ(η)→ 0 as η → 0.
Lemma 2: (Packing Lemma [15]): Let UN and V N(i) (i ∈ I and |I| ≤ 2NR) be i.i.d.
produced random sequences respectively with respect to the probabilities P (u) and P (v). The
random vector V N(i) is independent of UN . Then there exists η > 0 such that
lim
N→∞
P (∃i ∈ I s.t. (UN , V N(i)) ∈ TNη (P (u, v))) = 0
if R < I(U ;V )− ϕ(η), where ϕ(η)→ 0 as η → 0.
Lemma 3: (Balanced coloring lemma [5, p. 260]): For any , δ > 0 and sufficiently large
N , let UN , Y N1 and Y
N
2 be i.i.d. produced random sequences respectively with respect to the
6probabilities P (u), P (y1) and P (y2). Given yN2 and u
N , let TNP (y1|y2,u)(y
N
2 , u
N) be the conditional
strong typical set composed of all yN1 satisfying the fact that (y
N
1 , y
N
2 , u
N) are jointly typical. In
addition, for γ < |TNP (y1|y2,u)(yN2 , uN)|, let φ be a γ-coloring
φ : TN (P (y1))→ {1, 2, .., γ},
and φ−1(k) (k ∈ {1, 2, .., γ}) be a set composed of all yN1 such that φ(yN1 ) = k and yN1 ∈
TNP (y1|y2,u)(y
N
2 , u
N). Then we have
|φ−1(k)| ≤ |T
N
P (y1|y2,u)(y
N
2 , u
N)|(1 + δ)
γ
, (2.1)
where k ∈ {1, 2, .., γ}.
Applying Lemma 3, we can conclude that there are at least
|TNP (y1|y2,u)(yN2 , uN)|
|TN
P (y1|y2,u)(y
N
2 ,u
N )|(1+δ)
γ
=
γ
1 + δ
(2.2)
colors and at most γ colors mapped by the conditional strong typical set TNP (y1|y2,u)(y
N
2 , u
N).
Letting γ = |TNP (y1|y2,u)(yN2 , uN)| and using the properties of the conditional strong typical set
[15], we have
γ = |TNP (y1|y2,u)(yN2 , uN)| ≥ (1− 1)2N(1−2)H(Y1|U,Y2), (2.3)
where 1 and 2 tend to zero while N →∞.
B. Wyner-Ziv Coding Scheme for the Lossless SC-SI
Fig. 2: The lossless source coding with side information
In this subsection, we review the Wyner-Ziv coding scheme. For the lossless SC-SI shown in
Figure 2, the source XN is correlated with a side information Y N , and they are i.i.d. generated
according to the probability P (x, y). Using an encoding function φ : XN → {1, 2, ..., 2NR},
the transmitter compresses XN into an index W taking values in {1, 2, ..., 2NR}, and this
7index W together with the side information Y N are available at the receiver. The receiver
generates a reconstruction sequence UˆN = ϕ(W,Y N) by applying a reconstruction function
ϕ : {1, 2, ..., 2NR} × YN → UN to the index W and the side information Y N . The goal of the
communication is that the reconstruction sequence UˆN is jointly typical with the source XN
according to the probability P (u|x)× P (x).
A rate R is said to be achievable if for any  > 0, there exists a sequence of encoding and
reconstruction functions (φ, ϕ) such that
Pr{(XN , UˆN) /∈ TN (P (x, u))} → 0 (2.4)
as N → ∞. The following Wyner-Ziv Theorem given in [10] characterizes the minimum
achievable rate R of this lossless SC-SI problem.
Theorem 1: (Wyner-Ziv Theorem): For the SC-SI, the achievable rate R satisfies
R ≥ min
P (u|x)
(I(X;U)− I(Y ;U)) = min
P (u|x)
I(X;U |Y ), (2.5)
where U → X → Y and the alphabet of U is bounded by |U| ≤ |X |+ 1.
Achievable coding scheme for Theorem 1:
• Code-book generation: Generate 2N(R+R∗) i.i.d. sequences uN according to the probability
P (u), and index them as uN(l), where 1 ≤ l ≤ 2N(R+R∗). Partition all of the sequences uN
into 2NR bins, and each bin contains 2NR∗ sequences.
• Encoding: Given a source xN , the encoder finds an index l∗ such that (xN , uN(l∗)) are
jointly typical. If there is no such index, declare an encoding error. If there is more than
one such index, randomly choose one. Based on the covering lemma (see Lemma 1), the
encoding error approaches to zero when
R +R∗ ≥ I(X;U). (2.6)
Once the sequence uN(l∗) is chosen, the encoder sends the bin index w ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR}
that uN(l∗) belongs to.
• Decoding: Upon receiving the bin index w, the decoder finds the unique index lˆ∗ belonging
to bin w such that (yN , uN(lˆ∗)) are jointly typical. If there is no or more than one such
index, declare an decoding error. Based on the packing lemma (see Lemma 2), the decoding
error approaches to zero when
R∗ ≤ I(Y ;U). (2.7)
8• Combining (2.6) with (2.7), and minimizing the bound R ≥ I(X;U)− I(Y ;U), Theorem
1 is proved.
C. Application of Wyner-Ziv Coding Scheme to the Discrete Memoryless Channel with Feedback
It is well known that the feedback does not increase the capacity of a DMC, and hence the
classical channel coding method is enough to achieve the capacity of the DMC with feedback. In
this subsection, we apply the Wyner-Ziv coding scheme introduced in the last subsection to the
DMC with noiseless feedback, and propose a new feedback scheme for the DMC. We show that
this new feedback scheme also achieves the capacity of the DMC with feedback, and compare
this new scheme with the classical channel coding method.
Fig. 3: The DMC with noiseless feedback
New coding scheme for the channel with feedback:
For the feedback channels, the block Markov coding scheme has been shown to be a useful
tool to improve the receiver’s decoding performance. Now we propose a new coding scheme
for the DMC with feedback combining the Wyner-Ziv coding scheme with the block Markov
coding scheme for the feedback systems.
In the block Markov coding scheme, the messages are transmitted through n blocks, and
the codeword length in each block is N . Define the overall message w transmitted through
n blocks as w = (w1, ..., wn), where wi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is the message for the i-th block, and
wi ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR}. Similar to the construction of uN in Wyner-Ziv coding scheme, in block i
(1 ≤ i ≤ n), let w∗i and w∗∗i be two indexes respectively taking values in {1, 2, ..., 2NR∗} and
{1, 2, ..., 2NR∗∗}. In addition, for convenience, denote the random vectors XN , Y N and V N of
block i by X¯i, Y¯i and V¯i, respectively. The vector value is written in lower case letter.
• Code-book generation: In block i, generate 2N(R+R∗) i.i.d. sequences x¯i according to the
probability P (x), and index them as x¯i(wi, w∗i ), where 1 ≤ wi ≤ 2NR and 1 ≤ w∗i ≤ 2NR∗ .
Generate 2N(R∗+R∗∗) i.i.d. sequences v¯i according to the probability P (v|x, y), and index
9them as v¯i(w∗i , w
∗∗
i ), where 1 ≤ w∗∗i ≤ 2NR∗∗ . Here note that v¯i(w∗i , w∗∗i ) is similar to the
codeword uN described in the above Wyner-Ziv coding scheme, and w∗i is somewhat like
the bin index w of uN .
• Encoding: In block 1, the transmitter chooses x¯1(w1, 1) to transmit. In block i (2 ≤
i ≤ n), after receiving the feedback y¯i−1, the transmitter tries to choose a v¯i−1 such that
(v¯i−1, x¯i−1, y¯i−1) are jointly typical. If there is no such v¯i−1, declare an encoding error. If
there is more than one such v¯i−1, randomly choose one. Based on the covering lemma (see
Lemma 1), the encoding error approaches to zero when
R∗ +R∗∗ ≥ I(V ;X, Y ). (2.8)
Once the transmitter selects such a v¯i−1(w∗i−1, w
∗∗
i−1), he chooses x¯i(wi, w
∗
i−1) for transmis-
sion. In block n, after receiving the feedback y¯n−1, the transmitter tries to choose a v¯n−1 such
that (v¯n−1(w∗n−1, w
∗∗
n−1), x¯n−1, y¯n−1) are jointly typical. When successfully decoding such
v¯n−1(w∗n−1, w
∗∗
n−1), the transmitter picks out x¯n(1, w
∗
n−1) for transmission. The following
Figure 4 illustrates this encoding procedure.
• Decoding: The decoding procedure starts from the last block. At block n, the receiver
chooses a x¯n which is jointly typical with y¯n. For the case that more than one or no such
x¯n exists, proclaim an decoding error. Based on the packing lemma (see Lemma 2), this
decoding error approaches to zero when
R∗ ≤ I(Y ;X). (2.9)
After decoding x¯n, the receiver picks out w∗n−1 from it. Then he attempts to select only one
v¯n−1 such that given w∗n−1, v¯n−1 is jointly typical with y¯n−1 (this is similar to that in the
Wyner-Ziv coding scheme [10], where y¯n−1 serves as the side information). For the case
that more than one or no such v¯n−1 exists, proclaim an decoding error. On the basis of
Lemma 2, this decoding error approaches to zero when
R∗∗ ≤ I(Y ;V ). (2.10)
After obtaining such unique v¯n−1, the receiver tries to pick only one x¯n−1 which is jointly
typical with (y¯n−1, v¯n−1). According to Lemma 2, this decoding error approaches to zero
when
R +R∗ ≤ I(Y, V ;X). (2.11)
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After decoding x¯n−1, the receiver picks out wn−1 and w∗n−2 from it. Analogously, the receiver
decodes the messages wn−2, wn−3, ..., w1, and the decoding procedure is completed. The
following Figure 5 illustrates the decoding procedure.
• Now, substituting (2.10) into (2.8), we have
R∗ ≥ I(V ;X|Y ). (2.12)
Then substituting (2.12) into (2.11), we get
R ≤ I(Y, V ;X)− I(V ;X|Y )
= H(X)−H(X|Y, V )−H(X|Y ) +H(X|Y, V ) = I(X;Y ). (2.13)
From (2.13), it is easy to see that our new feedback scheme also achieves the capacity of
the DMC with feedback.
Comparison of this new scheme with the classical channel coding method:
From the above description of our new scheme, it is easy to see that the total number of
the codeword xN is 2N(R+R∗), which is upper bounded by 2NI(X;V,Y ). Since feedback does not
increase the capacity of a DMC, Shannon’s channel coding method [15] is enough to achieve
the capacity of the DMC with feedback. In the classical channel coding method, there exists a
one-to-one mapping between the transmitted message w and the codeword xN , hence the total
number of XN is 2NR, and it is upper bounded by 2NI(X;Y ). Since I(X;V, Y ) ≥ I(X;Y ), our
new scheme generates more codewords xN than the classical channel coding method does. In
Section IV, we will show that the number of xN has great influence on the achievable secrecy
rate of the WTC-NF. Due to the reason that our new scheme generates more xN than the classical
channel coding method does, we guess that combining this new feedback scheme for the DMC
with Ahlswede and Cai’s secret key based feedback coding scheme [5] may achieve a larger
secrecy rate for the WTC-NF.
III. MODEL FORMULATION AND THE MAIN RESULT
The discrete memoryless WTC-NF consists of one input xN , two outputs yN1 , y
N
2 , and satisfies
P (yN1 , y
N
2 |xN) =
N∏
i=1
P (y1,i, y2,i|xi), (3.1)
where xi ∈ X , y1,i ∈ Y1 and y2,i ∈ Y2.
11
Fig. 4: Encoding procedure of our new scheme for the DMC with feedback
Fig. 5: Decoding procedure of our new scheme for the DMC with feedback
Let W be the transmission message, its value belongs to the alphabet W = {1, 2, ...,M},
and Pr{W = i} = 1
M
for i ∈ W . Owing to feedback, the transmitter generates the time-t
channel input Xt as a function of the message W and the previously obtained channel outputs
Y1,1,...,Y1,t−1, i.e.,
Xt = ft(W,Y
t−1
1 ) (3.2)
for some stochastic encoding function ft (1 ≤ t ≤ N ).
After N channel uses, the legal receiver decodes W . Namely, the legal receiver generates the
guess
Wˆ = ψ(Y N1 ),
where ψ is the legal receiver’s decoding function. The average probability of the legal receiver’s
decoding error of the WTC-NF is denoted as
Pe =
1
M
∑
w∈W
Pr{ψ(yN1 ) 6= w|w sent}. (3.3)
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The equivocation rate of the WTC-NF is defined by
∆ =
1
N
H(W |Y N2 ). (3.4)
For the WTC-NF, we define an achievable secrecy rate R as follows. Given a positive number
R, if for arbitrarily small , there exists a pair of channel encoder and decoder with parameters
M , N and Pe satisfying
logM
N
≥ R− , (3.5)
∆ ≥ R− , (3.6)
Pe ≤ , (3.7)
R is called an achievable secrecy rate. The secrecy capacity Cfs is the supremum of achievable
secrecy rates for the WTC-NF, and a new lower bound on Cfs is shown in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: Cfs ≥ R∗s , where
R∗s = max
P (v|u,y1),P (x|u),P (u)
min{[I(Y1, V ;U)− I(Y2;U)]+ +H(Y1|Y2, U), I(Y1;U)}, (3.8)
the joint distribution is denoted by
P (u, v, x, y1, y2) = P (v|u, y1)P (y1, y2|x)P (u, x), (3.9)
and the alphabets of U and V are upper bounded by |U| ≤ |X |+1 and |V| ≤ |X |+2, respectively.
Proof: The bounds on the alphabets of U and V are due to the well known support lemma
[15, pp. 631-633], and we omit the proof here. The coding scheme in the proof of Theorem
2 combines the new coding scheme for the DMC with feedback shown in Section II with the
already existing scheme [5] for the WTC-NF, and it can be briefly illustrated as follows. First,
in each block, we split the transmitted message into two sub-messages: one is encoded exactly
the same as that in Wyner’s wiretap channel [1], and the other is encrypted by a key generated
from the feedback. Then, viewing the two processed sub-messages as a new message W , the
coding scheme in the proof of Theorem 2 is along the lines of the encoding and decoding
procedures described in the new coding scheme for the DMC with feedback (see Section II).
Here note that as we have shown in Section II, the total rate R does not exceed the main
channel capacity, i.e., R ≤ I(Y1;U). On the other hand, in each block, since the first sub-
message is encoded along the lines of the coding scheme for Wyner’s wiretap channel [1],
following the equivocation analysis of [1] and noticing that the total number of the codewords
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can be bounded by (2.11) (replacing X by U , and Y by Y1), the rate of the first sub-message
is upper bounded by [I(Y1, V ;U) − I(Y2;U)]+. For the second sub-message, its rate equals
to the rate of the key, and according to the secret key based feedback coding scheme [5],
the rate of the key is upper bounded by H(Y1|Y2, U). Hence the total rate R can be upper
bounded by R ≤ [I(Y1, V ;U) − I(Y2;U)]+ + H(Y1|Y2, U). Combining R ≤ I(Y1;U) with
R ≤ [I(Y1, V ;U)−I(Y2;U)]++H(Y1|Y2, U), and maximizing these two bounds, R∗s is obtained.
The detail of the proof is in Section IV.
Remark 1:
Several notes are given below.
• In [5], Ahlswede and Cai also provide an upper bound Cf−outs on C
f
s , and it is characterized
by
Cf−outs = max
P (x,u)
min{H(Y1|Y2), I(Y1;U)}, (3.10)
where the joint distribution is denoted by
P (u, x, y1, y2) = P (y1, y2|x)P (u, x). (3.11)
• For the degraded case X → Y1 → Y2, the upper bound Cf−outs reduces to
Cf−outs = max
P (x)
min{H(Y1|Y2), I(Y1;X)}, (3.12)
which is consistent with Ahlswede and Cai’s secret key based lower bound Rs (see (1.4)),
and this is because
I(Y1;X)− I(Y2;X) +H(Y1|Y2, X) = H(X|Y2)−H(X|Y1) +H(Y1|Y2, X)
(1)
= H(X|Y2)−H(X|Y1, Y2) +H(Y1|Y2, X)
= I(X;Y1|Y2) +H(Y1|Y2, X) = H(Y1|Y2), (3.13)
where (1) follows from X → Y1 → Y2. Since Rs meets the upper bound, Ahlswede and
Cai’s secret key based feedback coding scheme is optimal for this degraded WTC-NF, and
hence there is no need to further use V (an estimation of U and Y1) to enhance the lower
bound Rs, i.e., for this degraded case, our new lower bound R∗s reduces to the secret key
based lower bound Rs.
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IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Ahlswede and Cai’s secret key based feedback coding scheme [5] has been combined with the
new coding scheme for the DMC with feedback provided in Section II to show the achievability
of Theorem 2. Now the remainder of this section is organized as follows. The coding strategy
is introduced in Subsection IV-A, and the equivocation analysis is given in Subsection IV-B.
A. Coding Strategy
Definitions and notations:
• Similar to the new coding scheme for the DMC with feedback (see Section II), assume that
the transmission is through n blocks, and the codeword length in each block is N .
• The overall message W consists of n components (W = (W1, ...,Wn)), and each component
Wj (j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}) is the message transmitted in block j. The value of Wj belongs to the
set {1, ..., 2NR}. Then further split Wj into two parts Wj = (W1,j,W2,j), and the values of
W1,j and W2,j respectively belong to the sets {1, ..., 2NR1} and {1, ..., 2NR2}. Here notice
that R1 +R2 = R.
• Analogously, the randomly produced W ′ , which is used to confuse the wiretapper 1, also
consists of n components (W ′ = (W ′1, ...,W
′
n)), and the component W
′
j (j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n})
is transmitted in block j. Here note that W ′j is uniformly drawn from the set {1, ..., 2NR
′},
i.e., Pr{W ′j = i} = 2−NR
′
, where i ∈ {1, ..., 2NR′}.
• The help information W ∗, which is used to ameliorate the legal receiver’s decoding per-
formance, consists of n components (W ∗ = (W ∗1 , ...,W
∗
n)), and the value of W
∗
j (j ∈
{1, 2, ..., n}) belongs to the set {1, ..., 2NR∗}.
• In block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the random vectors XN , Y N1 , Y N2 , UN and V N are denoted by
X¯i, Y¯1,i, Y¯2,i, U¯i and V¯i, respectively. In addition, let Xn = (X¯1, ..., X¯n) be a collection
of the random vectors XN for all blocks. Analogously, we have Y n1 = (Y¯1,1, ..., Y¯1,n),
Y n2 = (Y¯2,1, ..., Y¯2,n), U
n = (U¯1, ..., U¯n) and V n = (V¯1, ..., V¯n). The vector value is written
in lower case letter.
Code-book generation:
1The idea of using random messages to confuse the wiretapper is exactly the same as the random binning technique used in
Wyner’s wiretap channel [1], where this randomly produced message is analogous to the randomly chosen bin index used in
the random binning scheme.
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• In block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), randomly produce 2N(R1+R2+R′+R∗) i.i.d. codewords u¯i on the
basis of P (u), and label them as u¯i(w1,i, w2,i, w
′
i, w
∗
i−1)
2, where w1,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR1},
w2,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR2}, w′i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR
′} and w∗i−1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR∗}.
• For each possible value of u¯i(w1,i, w2,i, w
′
i, w
∗
i−1) and y¯1,i, randomly produce 2
NR˜ i.i.d.
codewords v¯i on the basis of P (v|u, y1). Then label these v¯i as v¯i(w∗i , w∗∗i ), where w∗i ∈
{1, 2, ..., 2NR∗} and w∗∗i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2N(R˜−R∗)}.
• For a given u¯i, the transmitted sequence x¯i is i.i.d. produced on the basis of the probability
P (x|u).
Encoding strategy:
• For block 1, the transmitter chooses u¯1(w1,1, w2,1 = 1, w
′
1, w
∗
0 = 1) for transmission.
• For block i (i ∈ {2, 3, ..., n − 1}), before choosing u¯i, produce a mapping gi : y¯1,i−1 →
{1, 2, ..., 2NR2} (here note that this mapping is generated exactly the same as that in [5]).
Based on this mapping, generate a RV Ki = gi(Y¯1,i−1) taking values in {1, 2, ..., 2NR2},
and Pr{Ki = j} = 2−NR2 for j ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR2}. The RV Ki is used as a secret key and
it is not known to the wiretapper, and Ki is independent of the real transmitted messages
W1,i and W2,i for block i. Notice that ki = gi(y¯1,i−1) ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR2} is a real value of
Ki. The mapping gi is known to all parties. Once the transmitter receives y¯1,i−1, he tries to
choose a v¯i−1 such that (v¯i−1, u¯i−1, y¯1,i−1) are jointly typical. For the case that more than
one v¯i−1 exist, pick one at random; if no such v¯i−1 exists, proclaim an encoding error. On
the basis of Lemma 1, the encoding error approaches to zero when
R˜ ≥ I(U, Y1;V ). (4.1)
Once the transmitter selects such a v¯i−1(w∗i−1, w
∗∗
i−1), he picks out u¯i(w1,i, w2,i⊕ki, w′i, w∗i−1)
for transmission.
• At block n, after receiving the feedback y¯1,n−1, the transmitter tries to select a v¯n−1(w∗n−1, w
∗∗
n−1)
such that (v¯n−1(w∗n−1, w
∗∗
n−1), u¯n−1, y¯1,n−1) are jointly typical. When successfully decoding
such v¯n−1(w∗n−1, w
∗∗
n−1), the transmitter picks out u¯n(1, 1, 1, w
∗
n−1) for transmission.
Decoding strategy:
The decoding procedure starts from the last block, i.e., block n. At block n, the legal receiver
chooses a u¯n which is jointly typical with y¯1,n. For the case that more than one or no such
2Here we can also say u¯i is a function of w1,i, w2,i, w
′
i and w
∗
i−1
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u¯n exists, proclaim a decoding error. On the basis of Lemma 2, this kind of decoding error
approaches to zero when
R∗ ≤ I(Y1;U). (4.2)
After decoding u¯n, the legal receiver picks out w∗n−1 from it. Then he attempts to select only
one v¯n−1 such that given w∗n−1, v¯n−1 is jointly typical with y¯1,n−1. For the case that more than
one or no such v¯n−1 exists, proclaim a decoding error. On the basis of Lemma 2, this kind of
decoding error approaches to zero when
R˜−R∗ ≤ I(Y1;V ). (4.3)
After obtaining such unique v¯n−1, the legal receiver attempts to pick only one u¯n−1 which is
jointly typical with (y¯1,n−1, v¯n−1). According to Lemma 2, this kind of decoding error approaches
to zero when
R1 +R2 +R
′
+R∗ ≤ I(Y1, V ;U). (4.4)
After decoding u¯n−1, the legal receiver picks out w1,n−1, w2,n−1 ⊕ kn−1, w∗n−2 from it. No-
tice that the legal receiver has full knowledge of kn−1 = gn−1(y¯1,n−2), and hence he gets
the message wn−1 = (w1,n−1, w2,n−1). Analogously, the legal receiver decodes the messages
wn−2, wn−3, ..., w1, and the decoding procedure is completed. For convenience, the encoding and
decoding strategies are illustrated by the following Figure 6 and Figure 7, respectively.
Fig. 6: The encoding strategy for all blocks
B. Equivocation Analysis
The overall equivocation ∆, which is denoted by ∆ = 1
nN
H(W |Y n2 ), equals
∆
(a)
=
1
nN
(H(W˜1|Y n2 ) +H(W˜2|Y n2 , W˜1)), (4.5)
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Fig. 7: The decoding strategy for all blocks
where (a) is due to the definitions W˜1 = (W1,1, ...,W1,n) and W˜2 = (W2,1, ...,W2,n).
The first term H(W˜1|Y n2 ) of (4.5) follows that
H(W˜1|Y n2 ) = H(W˜1, Y n2 )−H(Y n2 )
= H(W˜1, Y
n
2 , U
n)−H(Un|W˜1, Y n2 )−H(Y n2 )
(b)
= H(Un)−H(Un|W˜1, Y n2 )− I(Un;Y n2 )
(c)
= (n− 1)NR1 + (n− 2)NR2 + (n− 1)NR′ + (n− 1)NR∗ − nNI(U ;Y2)−H(Un|W˜1, Y n2 )
(d)
≥ (n− 1)NR1 + (n− 2)NR2 + (n− 1)NR′ + (n− 1)NR∗ − nNI(U ;Y2)− nN3, (4.6)
where (b) is implied by H(W˜1|Un) = 0, (c) is due to the construction of Un and the channel is
memoryless, and (d) is due to that given w˜1 and yn2 , the wiretapper attempts to select only one
un that is jointly typical with his own received signals yn2 , and implied by Lemma 2, we can
conclude that the wiretapper’s decoding error approaches to zero if
R2 +R
′
+R∗ ≤ I(Y2;U), (4.7)
then applying Fano’s lemma, 1
nN
H(Un|W˜1, Y n2 ) ≤ 3 is obtained, where 3 → 0 while n,N →
∞.
Moreover, the second term H(W˜2|Y n2 , W˜1) of (4.5) follows that
H(W˜2|Y n2 , W˜1)
≥
n−1∑
i=2
H(W2,i|Y n2 , W˜1,W2,1 = 1, ...,W2,i−1,W2,i ⊕Ki)
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(e)
=
n−1∑
i=2
H(W2,i|Y¯2,i−1,W2,i ⊕Ki)
≥
n−1∑
i=2
H(W2,i|Y¯2,i−1, U¯i−1,W2,i ⊕Ki)
=
n−1∑
i=2
H(Ki|Y¯2,i−1, U¯i−1,W2,i ⊕Ki)
(f)
=
n−1∑
i=2
H(Ki|Y¯2,i−1, U¯i−1)
(g)
≥ (n− 2)(log 1− 1
1 + δ
+N(1− 2)H(Y1|U, Y2)), (4.8)
where (e) is due to the Markov chain W2,i → (Y¯2,i−1,W2,i ⊕Ki)→ (W˜1,W2,1, ...,W2,i−1,
Y¯2,1, ..., Y¯2,i−2, Y¯2,i, ..., Y¯2,n), (f) is implied by Ki → (Y¯2,i−1, U¯i−1)→ W2,i⊕Ki, and (g) is implied
by Lemma 3 that given y¯2,i−1 and u¯i−1, there are at least γ1+δ colors (see (2.2)), which indicates
that
H(Ki|Y¯2,i−1, U¯i−1) ≥ log γ
1 + δ
, (4.9)
then substituting (2.3) into (4.9), we get
H(Ki|Y¯2,i−1, U¯i−1) ≥ log 1− 1
1 + δ
+N(1− 2)H(Y1|U, Y2), (4.10)
where 1, 2 and δ approach to 0 as N goes to infinity.
Substituting (4.6) and (4.8) into (4.5), we have
∆ ≥ n− 1
n
(R1 +R
′
+R∗) +
n− 2
n
R2 − I(Y2;U)− 3
+
n− 2
nN
log
1− 1
1 + δ
+
n− 2
n
(1− 2)H(Y1|Y2, U). (4.11)
The bound (4.11) indicates that if
R
′
+R∗ ≥ I(Y2;U)−H(Y1|Y2, U), (4.12)
∆ ≥ R1 +R2 −  can be proved by selecting sufficiently large n and N .
Now combining (4.1) with (4.3), we get
R∗ ≥ I(U, Y1;V )− I(Y1;V ) = I(V ;U |Y1). (4.13)
Then implied by (4.13) and (4.4), we can conclude that
R1 +R2 +R
′ ≤ I(Y1, V ;U)− I(V ;U |Y1) = I(U ;Y1). (4.14)
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Next, implied by (4.12) and (4.4), we have
R1 +R2 ≤ I(Y1, V ;U)− I(Y2;U) +H(Y1|Y2, U). (4.15)
Finally applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination to remove R1, R2 (R = R1+R2), R
′ and R∗ from
(4.13), (4.14), (4.15), (4.2), (4.4), (4.7) and (4.12), Theorem 2 is proved.
Remarks: From the above proof, we see that the number of Un (see (4.6)) affects the secrecy
rate. Then it is easy to explain why our new feedback scheme gains an advantage over Ahlswede
and Cai’s secret key based scheme [5], and this is because our new scheme generates more Un
(see (4.4), the number of Un is about 2nNI(Y1,V ;U)) than Ahlswede and Cai’s scheme does (the
number of Un in Ahlswede and Cai’s scheme is about 2nNI(Y1;U)).
V. THE NON-DEGRADED WTC-NF
The non-degraded WTC is the original basis for what now forms the compound WTC, which
has been extensively investigated in [11]-[14]. In order to study whether our new feedback
scheme helps to increase the secrecy capacity of the non-degraded WTC, and whether our new
scheme takes advantage over the previous feedback scheme [5], in this section, we study the
non-degraded WTC-NF, see Figure 8.
From Figure 8, we know that for the non-degraded WTC-NF, given the channel input X ,
the channel output Y1 for the legal receiver is independent of the channel output Y2 for the
wiretapper, i.e., the Markov condition Y1 → X → Y2 holds for the non-degraded WTC-NF.
Hence we see that the non-degraded WTC-NF is a special case of the WTC-NF described in
Figure 1. For the non-degraded WTC-NF, its secrecy capacity is denoted as Cf∗s , and lower and
upper bounds on Cf∗s are given as below.
Theorem 3: Cf∗s ≥ R∗∗s , where
R∗∗s = max
P (v|x,y1)P (x)
min{[I(X;Y1, V )− I(X;Y2)]+ +H(Y1|X), I(X;Y1)}, (5.1)
the joint distribution is denoted by
P (v, x, y1, y2) = P (v|x, y1)P (y1|x)P (y2|x)P (x), (5.2)
and V is bounded in cardinality by |V| ≤ |X |+ 2.
Proof: Replacing U by X , and along the lines of the proof of Theorem 2, the rate
max
P (v|x,y1)P (x)
min{[I(X;Y1, V )− I(X;Y2)]+ +H(Y1|X, Y2), I(X;Y1)}
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Fig. 8: The non-degraded WTC-NF
is shown to be achievable. Then applying the Markov condition Y1 → X → Y2 to eliminate Y2
in H(Y1|X, Y2), the secrecy rate R∗∗s is obtained.
Theorem 4: Cf∗s ≤ Cf∗−outs , where
Cf∗−outs = max
P (x)
min{H(Y1|Y2), I(X;Y1)}, (5.3)
and the joint distribution is denoted by
P (x, y1, y2) = P (y1|x)P (y2|x)P (x). (5.4)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Finally, replacing U by X , along the proof of (1.3) (see [5]), and using the Markov condition
Y1 → X → Y2 to eliminate Y2 in H(Y1|X, Y2), an achievable secrecy rate Rnons of the non-
degraded WTC-NF, which is constructed by Ahlswede and Cai’s feedback coding scheme [5],
is given by
Rnons = max
P (x)
min{[I(X;Y1)− I(X;Y2)]+ +H(Y1|X), I(X;Y1)}. (5.5)
The comparison of Rnons and our new achievable secrecy rate R
∗∗
s will be given in the next
section.
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VI. BINARY EXAMPLE
We consider a binary example. In this example, the channel consists of binary input and
outputs satisfying
Y1 = X ⊕ Z1, Y2 = X ⊕ Z2, (6.1)
where ⊕ is the modulo addition over {0, 1}, the noise Z1 is Bern(p1) (p1 < 0.5), and the noise
Z2 is Bern(p2) (p2 < 0.5). The noises Z1 and Z2 are independent of X , and they are mutually
independent. From (6.1) and the properties of Z1 and Z2, we can conclude that the Markov
condition Y1 → X → Y2 holds for this binary example, and hence this binary model is a kind
of the non-degraded WTC.
First, from [15, Example 22.1], the secrecy capacity Cbs of the binary non-degraded WTC is
characterized by
Cbs = [h(p2)− h(p1)]+, (6.2)
where h(u) = −u log(u)− (1− u) log(1− u) and [u]+ = max{0, u}.
Second, define P (x = 0) = α and P (x = 1) = 1− α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1), then from (6.1) we have
P (Y1 = 0) = α ? p1, P (Y1 = 1) = α ? (1− p1), (6.3)
P (Y2 = 0) = α ? p2, P (Y2 = 1) = α ? (1− p2), (6.4)
where u?v = u(1−v)+(1−u)v. Now substituting (6.3), (6.4) and (6.1) into (5.5), an achievable
rate Cb−insf of the binary non-degraded WTC-NF, which is constructed according to [5], is given
by
Cb−insf = max
P (x)
min{[I(X;Y1)− I(X;Y2)]+ +H(Y1|X), I(X;Y1)}
= max
α
min{[h(α ? p1)− h(p1)− h(α ? p2) + h(p2)]+ + h(p1), h(α ? p1)− h(p1)}
(1)
= min{[h(p2)− h(p1)]+ + h(p1), 1− h(p1)}, (6.5)
where (1) is achieved when α = 1
2
.
Third, to calculate our new achievable rate Cb−in−newsf for the binary non-degraded WTC-NF,
define P (x = 0) = α and P (x = 1) = 1 − α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1), and further define P (v = 0|x =
0, y1 = 0) = γ1, P (v = 1|x = 0, y1 = 0) = 1 − γ1, P (v = 0|x = 0, y1 = 1) = γ2, P (v =
1|x = 0, y1 = 1) = 1 − γ2, P (v = 0|x = 1, y1 = 0) = γ3, P (v = 1|x = 1, y1 = 0) = 1 − γ3,
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P (v = 0|x = 1, y1 = 1) = γ4, P (v = 1|x = 1, y1 = 1) = 1 − γ4. Then substituting (6.1) into
Theorem 3, our new rate Cb−in−newsf is calculated by
Cb−in−newsf = maxα,γ1,γ2,γ3,γ4
min{[A− h(α ? p2) + h(p2)]+ + h(p1), h(α ? p1)− h(p1)}(6.6)
where
A = γ1α(1− p1) log γ1(1− p1)
γ1α(1− p1) + γ3p1(1− α)
+(1− γ1)α(1− p1) log (1− γ1)(1− p1)
(1− γ1)α(1− p1) + (1− γ3)p1(1− α)
+γ2p1α log
γ2p1
γ2p1α + γ4(1− p1)(1− α)
+(1− γ2)p1α log (1− γ2)p1
(1− γ2)p1α + (1− γ4)(1− p1)(1− α)
+γ3p1(1− α) log γ3p1
γ3p1(1− α) + γ1(1− p1)α
+(1− γ3)p1(1− α) log (1− γ3)p1
(1− γ3)p1(1− α) + (1− γ1)(1− p1)α
+γ4(1− p1)(1− α) log γ4(1− p1)
γ4(1− p1)(1− α) + γ2p1α
+(1− γ4)(1− p1)(1− α) log (1− γ4)(1− p1)
(1− γ4)(1− p1)(1− α) + (1− γ2)p1α.
Finally, to show the gap between the lower and upper bounds, we calculate the upper bound
Cb−outsf on the secrecy capacity of the binary non-degraded WTC-NF. Let P (x = 0) = α and
P (x = 1) = 1− α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1), then from (6.1), we have
P (Y1 = 0, Y2 = 0) = α(1− p1)(1− p2) + (1− α)pq,
P (Y1 = 0, Y2 = 1) = α(1− p1)p2 + (1− α)p1(1− p2),
P (Y1 = 1, Y2 = 0) = αp1(1− p2) + (1− α)(1− p1)p2,
P (Y1 = 1, Y2 = 1) = αpq + (1− α)(1− p1)(1− p2). (6.7)
Substituting (6.7), (6.3), (6.4) and (6.1) into Theorem 4, the upper bound Cb−outsf for this binary
case is given by
Cb−outsf = maxα
min{B, h(α ? p1)− h(p1)}, (6.8)
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where
B = (α(1− p1)(1− p2) + (1− α)pq) log α(1− p2) + (1− α)p2
α(1− p1)(1− p2) + (1− α)pq
+(α(1− p1)p2 + (1− α)p1(1− p2)) log αp2 + (1− α)(1− p2)
α(1− p1)p2 + (1− α)p1(1− p2)
+(αp1(1− p2) + (1− α)(1− p1)p2) log α(1− p2) + (1− α)p2
αp1(1− p2) + (1− α)(1− p1)p2
+(αpq + (1− α)(1− p1)(1− p2)) log αp2 + (1− α)(1− p2)
αpq + (1− α)(1− p1)(1− p2) ,
and α ? p1 = α(1− p1) + (1− α)p1.
Numerical results for our new achievable rate Cb−in−newsf , Ahlswede and Cai’s rate C
b−in
sf ,
the upper bound Cb−outsf on the secrecy capacity of the binary non-degraded WTC-NF, and the
secrecy capacity Cbs of the binary non-degraded WTC are given in the following Figs. 9-12.
From these figures, we see that our new scheme dominates the previous scheme [5] when p2 is
sufficiently small, and the achievable rates of both schemes equal to the legal receiver’s channel
capacity 1−h(p1) when p2 is increasing, while this is impossible for the WTC without feedback.
Furthermore, as we see in these figures, the gap between our new achievable rate and Ahlswede
and Cai’s rate [5] is decreasing while p1 is increasing, which indicates that our new scheme
gains more advantage over the previous scheme [5] when the channel noise of the legitimate
parties is small. Moreover, these figures show that the gap between the upper and lower bounds
is decreasing while p1 is increasing. In Figure 11, it is shown that for p1 = 0.1, our new scheme
achieves the secrecy capacity of the binary non-degraded WTC-NF (Cb−in−newsf = C
b−out
sf for all
p2), and it performs better than the previous scheme [5]. In Figure 12, it is shown that when p1
goes up to 0.2, both our new scheme and the previous scheme [5] achieve the secrecy capacity
of the binary non-degraded WTC-NF (Cb−in−newsf = C
b−in
sf = C
b−out
sf for all p2), which equals to
the main channel capacity 1− h(p1).
VII. CONCLUSION
A new feedback strategy of the WTC-NF is proposed, and it is shown to be better than the
already existing feedback strategy for the WTC-NF. The result of this paper is further illustrated
by a binary symmetric case, and it is shown that the advantage of this new feedback strategy is
highlighted when the channel noises are small.
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Fig. 9: Comparison of the bounds in (6.2), (6.5), (6.6) and (6.8) for p1 = 0.05 and several values
of p2
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
First, define
X , XJ , Y1 , Y1,J , Y2 , Y2,J , (A1)
where J is a time sharing RV uniformly distributed in {1, 2, ..., N} and it is independent of the
random vectors XN , Y N1 and Y
N
2 .
Then, notice that
R− 
(1)
≤ 1
N
H(W )
=
1
N
(I(W ;Y N1 ) +H(W |Y N1 ))
(2)
≤ 1
N
(I(W ;Y N1 ) + δ(Pe))
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Fig. 10: Comparison of the bounds in (6.2), (6.5), (6.6) and (6.8) for p1 = 0.08 and several
values of p2
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Y1,i|Y i−11 )−H(Y1,i|W,Y i−11 )) +
δ(Pe)
N
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Y1,i)−H(Y1,i|W,Y i−11 , Xi)) +
δ(Pe)
N
(3)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Y1,i)−H(Y1,i|Xi)) + δ(Pe)
N
(4)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Y1,i|J = i)−H(Y1,i|Xi, J = i)) + δ(Pe)
N
(5)
= H(Y1,J |J)−H(Y1,J |XJ , J) + δ(Pe)
N
(6)
≤ H(Y1,J)−H(Y1,J |XJ) + δ()
N
(7)
= I(X;Y1) +
δ()
N
, (A2)
where (1) is due to (3.5), (2) is implied by Fano’s lemma, (3) is due to the main channel is
discrete memoryless, i.e., the Markov condition (W,Y i−11 ) → Xi → Y1,i holds, (4) is due to
J is independent of the random vectors XN , Y N1 and Y
N
2 , (5) is due to Pr{J = i} = 1N for
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Fig. 11: Comparison of the bounds in (6.2), (6.5), (6.6) and (6.8) for p1 = 0.1 and several values
of p2
1 ≤ i ≤ N , (6) is implied by the Markov chain J → XJ → Y1,J , Pe ≤  and δ(Pe) is a
monotonic increasing function of Pe, and (7) is implied by (A1). Letting → 0 (here note that
δ()→ 0 as → 0), we get R ≤ I(X;Y1).
Moreover, also notice that
R− 
(a)
≤ 1
N
H(W |Y N2 )
=
1
N
(H(W |Y N2 ) +H(W |Y N2 , Y N1 )−H(W |Y N2 , Y N1 ))
(b)
≤ 1
N
(H(W |Y N2 ) + δ(Pe)−H(W |Y N2 , Y N1 ))
=
1
N
(I(W ;Y N1 |Y N2 ) + δ(Pe))
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
H(Y1,i|Y2,i) + δ(Pe)
N
(c)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
H(Y1,i|Y2,i, J = i) + δ(Pe)
N
(d)
= H(Y1,J |Y2,J , J) + δ(Pe)
N
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Fig. 12: Comparison of the bounds in (6.2), (6.5), (6.6) and (6.8) for p1 = 0.2 and several values
of p2
(e)
≤ H(Y1,J |Y2,J) + δ()
N
(f)
= H(Y1|Y2) + δ()
N
, (A3)
where (a) is implied by (3.6), (b) is implied by Fano’s lemma, (c) is implied by J is independent
of the random vectors XN , Y N1 and Y
N
2 , (d) is implied by Pr{J = i} = 1N for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , (e)
is implied by Pe ≤  and δ(Pe) is a monotonic increasing function of Pe, and (f) is implied by
(A1). Letting → 0, we get R ≤ H(Y1|Y2).
Combining (A2) and (A3), we have R ≤ min{I(X;Y1), H(Y1|Y2)}. Here note that both the
characters I(X;Y1) and H(Y1|Y2) are functions of P (x), then choosing a P (x) to maximize
min{I(X;Y1), H(Y1|Y2)}, we get R ≤ max min{I(X;Y1), H(Y1|Y2)}. The proof of Theorem 4
is completed.
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